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1. The Greek polis - a State or a stateless society?  
During the summer of 415 BC, Athenians were in a deeply suspicious mood 
caused by the recent two events, the mutilation of the herms and the 
profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries.  The more the names of the 
suspects who allegedly involved in the incidents were exposed, the more the 
citizens believed that a large scale of conspiracy against their democracy was 
going on.  In this critical moment, the Council of Five Hundred, which was 
then empowered to deal with the matter, took a pre-emptive action against 
the conspirators.  According to Andokides: 
 
They (i.e. the Council) summoned the generals and ordered them to proclaim that 
the citizens resident in the city were to proceed under arms to the Agora; those 
between the Long Walls to the Theseion; and those in Peiraeus to the Agora of 
Hippodamos.  The cavalrymen were to be mustered at the Anakeion by trumpet 
before nightfall, while the Council would take up its quarters on the Acropolis 
during the night, and the prytanes in the Tholos. ...1 
 
     This ‘total mobilisation’ of Athenian citizens is often referred to as 
showing how small a public coercive power was available in Athens.2 It is 
citizens themselves that were mobilised to be on guard against conspirators, 
not an organised police force nor standing army, because there were no such 
organisations.  Compared to the modern State (capital ‘S’), the absence of 
police force is noteworthy.  Sociologists and political scientists have often 
seen the true nature of State in coercive power.  Max Weber, most typically 
and famously, defines the State as a political organisation whose 
                                                           
1 Andokides 1.45, E. Maidment’s translation in Loeb Classical Library (modified).  See 
also Thukydides 6.61.2. 
2 For example, s.v. ‘police’ (by T. Cornell) in The Oxford Classical Dictionary3 (Oxford, 
1996).  See also Finley (1983)18-21; Hunter (1994)120. 
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‘administrative staff successfully uphold the claim to the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order’.3  It is quite 
natural that many ancient historians have seen a specific feature of the 
Greek polis in this absence of police force.4 
     If, then, the polis does not have one of the essential elements of the 
State, how should we classify it?  Is it still a State, an imperfect or minimal 
State?  Or is it something else?  This is the issue which Moshe Berent has 
recently tackled in a series of articles.5  Starting from Weber’s (and E. 
Gellner’s) emphasis on violence for the concept of the State, Berent confirms 
that the state-coercive apparatus which was available in the polis (e.g. the 
Eleven in Athens) had only a rudimentary character.  Thus, he argues, the 
polis is not a State: it is rather what anthropologists call a ‘stateless society 
(or community)’, which is characterised by the absence of public coercive 
apparatus.6  Because of the lack of police system, most of the arrests were 
carried out by self-help.  As a result, in the polis ‘force is never public and 
always private’ (1996: 48).  In addition, ‘the law [of the polis], in order to be 
law, must be identical with customs of the community’ (ibid., 47)  because 
‘[t]he laws have no State power behind them’ (ibid., 49).  It has also no 
standing army (except Sparta and Athenian navy).  While the State can be 
acknowledged to be an entity with a life of its own, the polis has only a 
rudimentary form of the impersonal character.  The polis is a stateless 
society and identified with its citizens.  
                                                           
3 Weber (1968)54 = Weber (1972)29 ‘Staat soll ein politischer Anstaltsbetrieb heißen, 
wenn und insoweit sein Verwaltungsstab erfolgreich das Monopollegitimen physischen 
Zwanges für die Durchführung der Ordnungen in Anspruch nimmt’. 
4 e.g. Finley (1983)18; Osborne (1985)7; Cartledge (2000)  The (Greek) polis in this paper 
is that of the archaic and classical periods.  The Hellenistic and Roman poleis are beyond 
the scope of the present paper. 
5 Berent (1996), (1998), (2000a), (2000b), (2004) 
6  ‘Stateless society’ is a category originally invented by  M. Fortes and E.E. 
Evans-Pritchard in their African Political Systems (1940) to describe societies ‘which lack 
government, administrative machinery, and constituted judicial institutions --in short 
which lack government-- and in which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status or 
wealth’ (1940: 5).  Notice that Berent uses the model with some qualifications.  Berent 
(1998)345, (2000a)262, and especially (2000b)8-9: ‘As the polis had a much more complex 
political and economic structure than (tribal) acephalous societies, one could not argue 
that the work with a very basic and Procrustean distinction between stateless societies 
and State is problematic as far as the Greek polis is concerned’.  On Berent’s view of the 
polis as not a ‘tribal society’, see also Hansen (2002)42-44. 
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     Berent’s view, however, has met criticism from M.H. Hansen.7  Giving 
a wide range of references from the ancient poleis to early modern (i.e. 
pre-nineteenth century) European countries, Hansen insists that the Greek 
polis should be a State.  It would be convenient to sum up his argument in 
the following three points.  First, according to Hansen, Berent oversimplifies 
Weber’s concept of the State: ‘[t]he monopoly of force is now universally 
emphasised in almost every discussion of the concept of state, but the sheer 
monopoly of force ... does not in itself constitute a state’ 8.  When one 
considers whether an organisation is a State or not, all the three elements 
(government, territory and population) should be taken into account: no 
single element is sufficient.  Second, it is true that ‘the polis is identified 
with its citizens, but it also true that it is often seen as an impersonal 
abstract power above both rulers and ruled’ (22).  Third, the polis has a 
territory, body politic and government (or officials) to enforce law and order.  
Despite the absence of police force, administration of justice in most cases 
was done by officials.  He concludes that the polis was definitely not a 
stateless community but a type of State. 
     This debate9 is concerned with the major issue ‘What is the Greek 
polis?’.  I myself am not now interested in whether the polis should be 
defined as a State or a stateless society.  Nor shall I deal with the 
complicated matters, such as definitions of the State and stateless society.10  
What interests me is the issue of public coercive power in the polis.  Since 
Berent’s argument is based on the absence of public coercive apparatus in the 
Greek polis, one of the key topics in the debate is, inevitably, about whether 
                                                           
7 Hansen (2002), the main target of which is Berent (1996).   
8 Hansen (2002)26.  In the following text, I quote this article by page numbers. 
9 After Hansen (2002), Berent (2004) appears as a rejoinder, to which Hansen reacts 
aloofly in his (2005)22,n.1. 
10 I, thus, do not discuss which concept of the State should be accepted, Berent’s or 
Hansen’s.  I, however, point out one problem with Hansen’s way of dealing with the 
concept of the State.  Hansen (2002: 19-21), mentioning several elements he thinks to be 
crucial for the concept of State (government, territory, population, body-politic, etc), 
examines whether each of these is valid for the concept of the polis (The same way of 
argument can also be seen in Hansen [1998] 117-123 where he considers whether the polis 
should be grouped into the State or not).  But all that this sort of comparison brings to us 
are ‘apparent’ or ‘superficial’ similarities and differences unless we examine how those 
elements are interrelated with each other and how they function in their interrelations.  
It does not seem to me that Hansen is conscious enough of it. 
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or not the polis monopolises the legitimate use of violence.  Here, rather 
than Berent’s claim, Hansen’s counterclaim that ‘the polis came fairly close to 
having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ (30) needs to be examined, 
because, if this claim is true, our understanding of the polis must be 
considerably changed.  There are scholars who define the polis as a State, 
but very few who view the polis as monopolising violence.  In his 2004 
rejoinder, Berent tries to elaborate the concept of stateless society and 
criticises not only Hansen but also other ancient historians (including Finley, 
Hunter and Morris) who, while noting the absence of a coercive apparatus, 
still regards the polis as a State.  But he does not engage himself in 
re-examining each of the examples Hansen gives for his case.11  So, in this 
paper, I shall mainly examine Hansen’s claim and his way of argument in 
some detail, though I do not find Berent’s argument completely persuasive.  
I shall show my disagreements with Berent in the course of the discussion. 
     The antithetical views of the polis between Hansen and Berent have 
been already noticed and reviewed by Faraguna (2000), whose focus is on 
whether the polis should be grouped as a State or a steteless community.  
The examination of the debate in terms of violence is still worth doing.    
2.  Public Coercive Power of the Polis 
(1) Monopoly of the Legitimate Use of Violence 
     First of all, we need to clarify what it means to claim that the State 
monopolises legitimate use of physical force.  What does Weber, for example, 
try to claim by his celebrated definition of State?  We should notice that 
Weber connects the use of coercive power with maintaining social order.12  
That is, to monopolise the legitimate use of violence means that the State (or 
government) exclusively holds in its own hand physical force and prevents 
private individuals or social groups (e.g. family, tribe) from resorting to it; by 
so doing the State has ‘legitimate’ power to arrest and punish wrongdoers 
and keeps social order within its territory as a whole.   
     Thus, if a State monopolises coercive power, it is the duty of the State 
                                                           
11 But some of Hansen’s claims have been persuasively countercriticised by Berent.  See, 
for example, Berent (2004) 115-116 on Hansen’s bizarre argument (2002: 38-39) about the 
standing army of the polis. 
12 See above n.3 
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(or its officials) to keep up social order.  It is not true that the State always 
resorts to violence to maintain its domination: there are many other effective 
ways of upholding state domination (e.g. ideology).  In everyday life, indeed, 
these non-violent ways are often much more useful for keeping social order 
than real violence, as is shown in the studies by scholars such as Althusser 
and Bourdieu.13  However, when these ways fail, the State can still resort to 
physical force or a threat of it to maintain its domination: without it the State 
does not deserve to be called a State.14 
     Let us turn here to the Greek polis and Hansen’s claim.  According to 
Hansen, there are ‘sources which show that in the majority of cases the polis 
came fairly close to having a monopoly of the legitimate use of force’ (30).  
Administration of justice in the polis, thus, was largely carried out by officials, 
and ‘an element of violence is a necessary foundation of any polis’ (31).  It is 
true that self-help was legal in many poleis, but only in a very limited 
number of offences (32-34).  Although apprehension of criminals was usually 
carried out by victims themselves, there were, in democratic Athens at least, 
also other ways to ask for intervention of the authorities.  In addition, there 
is a case in which a public apparatus, like the Council, carried out inquiry 
into and arrest of suspects of conspiracy (34-36, see ‘Introduction’ of this 
paper).  Imprisonment as a punishment can be confirmed in many poleis.  
Not only in the case of public matters but also in some private matters 
sentences were executed by officials.  ‘[W]ith the few exceptions the polis did 
have a monopoly of force and the exclusive right to punish is recognised as 
one of the essential features of the polis’ (37).   
     In order to say that ‘the polis came fairly close to having a monopoly of 
violence’, however, it is necessary to show that social order in the polis was 
maintained by that monopoly of violence, i.e. by the officials who hold 
exclusively the use of physical force.  This is what Hansen fails to show.  All 
Hansen demonstrates, in his ample examples, is that there are areas where 
public officials and apparatus were involved in administration of justice in 
the polis.  While it is possible that the officials step in keeping up social 
                                                           
13 L. Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ in: Lenin and Philosophy and 
Other Essays (New York, 1971), 127-187; P. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Oxford, 1990), 
122-134.   
14 Weber (1972)821-822. 
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order, this ‘step-in’ by them does not mean that the polis ‘monopolises’ public 
coercive force, because they did not take an initiative in intervening in 
disputes or quarrels among citizens.  To put it in Hunter’s words, 
‘arguments were settled, violence quelled, and miscreants apprehended 
without the intervention of the authorities at all’.15  Social order, as Hunter 
shows at least in the case of democratic Athens, largely maintained by 
self-regulations or ‘hue and cry’ by private citizens, not by public apparatus.  
Here it would be good to refer to the case I put in the beginning of this paper: 
the inquiry by the Council into and arrest of the suspects of the scandals in 
415, which Hansen (34) sees as one of the examples for his case.  The 
Council did arrest the suspects and many of them were put to death 
(Thukydides 6.60.4).  But the whole process began with an impeachment 
(eisangelia) against Alkibiades by a citizen, Pythonikos, in the assembly 
(Andokides 1.11), not with the Council or other public apparatus.16 
     There is another problem with Hansen’s way of argument.  Hansen 
points out that self-help killing was restricted to a limited number of offences 
(adulterers, night burglars, traitors, exiles who returned without 
permission)17 and allowed only if perpetrator was caught in the act.  In 
other cases ‘[n]o person was allowed to take the law into his own hands, and 
an offender had to be tried before a court appointed by the polis’ (32).18  But, 
as far as the issue of monopoly of the legitimate use of violence is concerned, 
what matters is not only whether self-help is restricted but also against what 
type of offences self-help is legally applied.  In many poleis, according to 
Xenophon (Hieron 3.3), citizens were allowed to kill adulterers.  In several 
poleis at least, it was legal and even encouraged to kill those suspected of 
conspiracy against the constitution.  Both types of offences are a major 
                                                           
15 Hunter (1994)120. 
16 It is true that no State, whether modern or not, can maintain social order without 
self-help.  However, we should not overlook the fact that in the Greek polis in general 
self-help or private initiative played a more critical role for social order than in modern 
states. 
17  Adulterers: Demosthenes 23.53; Xenophon, Hieron, 3.3; Ath.Pol.57.3. Burglars: 
Demosthenes 24.113. Exiles: Demosthenes 23.28. Conspirators: ML 43(Miletus); 
Andokides 1.96-97. cf. Lykurgos 1.124-127 (Athens); RO 49 (Amphipolis); SEG 12.87 
(Athens); SEG 51.1105 (Eretria; on this text, see Knoepfler [2001] and [2002]); IK Ilion, 25 
(Ilion; on this text, see Maffi [2005]).   
18 This is not entirely true.  See Ath.Pol.40.2 with Cohen (2005)229-235. 
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threat to the foundation of the polis: one is an attack on the oikos, the most 
basic social unit of the polis, the other an attack on the constitution.  The 
polis, far from monopolising violence to defend itself, largely relies on private 
initiative of its citizens.   
(2) Power of Officials 
     As Hansen points out, we know lots of examples that laws and decrees 
instruct officials to implement the decisions: ‘[t]hey (i.e. officials) had the 
exclusive right to summon and preside over the decision-making bodies, and, 
most importantly, they were responsible for the carrying into effect of the 
decisions made by the citizens in the assembly or in the court’ (29).  One of 
the reasons why Hansen insists on ‘stateness’ of the polis lies here: the polis 
has a network of officials with prerogatives to perform their duties; this 
means that it has a government; therefore, it must be a State.  As far as our 
purpose is concerned, the question should be: how was it possible (or 
impossible) to implement their duties?  Or, to put it another way, what is 
the relation between officials and private citizens?19  What is the power 
exercised by officials?   
     In this point, Berent’s argument is simple and clear.  Sharing public 
offices in turn among citizens is one of the fundamental features of the polis.  
It is true in democracy in particular, but also true even in oligarchy among 
the full citizens who are a minority in the whole citizen body.  This leads 
Berent to argue that there is no ruler in the polis: ‘it was indeed not governed 
and ungovernable’ (1996: 45). 20  Since there is neither government nor 
public coercive apparatus, the law is, as Aristotle (Politics 1269a20-23) 
implies,21 ‘identical with the customs of the community’ (ibid., 47).  ‘[F]orce 
is never public and always private’ (1996: 48). 
     Hansen disagrees.  To refute Berent, Hansen points out (27) that (a) 
there is a distinction between citizens and non-citizens in the polis, and (b) a 
citizen cannot rule and be ruled at the same time.  At one particular point of 
time there is a clear distinction between those who, as officials, have power to 
                                                           
19 Finley (1982)17-23 deals with this issue from the viewpoint of legitimacy and ideology.   
20 Yet he slightly changes his expression on this matter in Berent (2004),133. 
21 Politics 1269a 20-24: ὀ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχὺν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος 
τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὥστε τό ῥᾳδίως μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὐπαρχόντων 
νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους καινοὺς ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖν ἐστι τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. 
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enforce decisions by assembly or verdict by courts, and those who are 
expected to obey them.  Sharing offices in turn among the citizens, thus, 
does not immediately mean that there was neither the ruler nor the ruled.  
Berent’s argument that the polis was ungovernable oversimplifies the 
situation.  In addition, Berent’s reading of Aristotle is not correct.  What 
Aristotle says there is not that law is identical with the customs of the 
community but that the strength of law to make people obey it comes from 
longevity.22  This is not the same as saying that law is habit. 
     So far so good.  Hansen goes on to quote another passage from the 
Politics (1321b40-22a7), that the office (ἀρχή) for administration of justice (i.e. 
execution of punishments, recovery of debts due to the state and the custody 
of prisoners) is most indispensable (ἀναγκαιοτάτη).  From this passage he 
concludes laws must be enforced and an element of violence is a necessary 
foundation of any polis (31).   
     But Hansen overlooks that Aristotle, in the same passage just 
mentioned above, also views the office for enforcement of law, unlike other 
offices, as most difficult (χαλεπωτάτη) .23  The office is involved ‘a good deal of 
odium; and unless it affords opportunities for making considerable gains, 
men either shrink from it or, if they accept it, are reluctant to perform their 
duties with the rigour the law demands’ (translation by Barker).  So difficult 
that Aristotle proposes the task should be divided into several offices.  If, as 
Hansen assumes, physical force is a foundation of any polis and law is 
enforced on this foundation, how can it be so difficult?  Enforcement of law 
might invite odium, but the officials have power to subdue resistance because 
they hold coercive force.  This passage is, in fact, opposed to Hansen’s view, 
and strongly suggests that enforcement of law is basically not based on 
violence.   
     Aristotle seems to think that the difficulty is peculiar to the offices of 
administration of justice, such as the Eleven in Athens.  Yet we know that 
exaction of fines is also the task of many other offices.  This implies that the 
                                                           
22 This is Hansen’s interpretation.  Even if law is identical with the custom of the 
community, Berent does not discuss the assembly decrees which have a binding force.  
Evidently, these are not customs.   
23 Politics 1321b40-1322a1: µετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ 
χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰς πρὰξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων 
κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν σωμάτων. 
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issue needs to be viewed in a broader context.24  Unlike their counterparts in 
the modern society, Greek officials, not only those who engaged in 
administration of justice but also those in other works, must be responsible 
for all of what they have done during their term.  A charge can be brought 
against officials at the end of their term (euthyna).  As Berent rightly 
emphasises,25 it is always not against the polis but the official in person that 
a charge is directed.  Thus, although officials are entitled to perform their 
duties, their power automatically makes secure their performances, 
especially in the democracy in which they were chosen by the lottery system.   
     It is true that Athenians instruct their ephebes (young citizens who 
come of their age) to take an oath to obey their officials.26  This and other 
evidence lead Rubinstein (1998) to make her case that there is a clear 
distinction between officials and private citizens (idiotai) and that the 
relation between them is hierarchical.  Citizens are expected to obey and 
pay respect for laws and officials.  Their relationship can be called 
hierarchical and, to that extent, is based on power.  But the existence itself 
of power relations between officials and private citizens does not necessarily 
mean that the former 'rule' the latter.27  The fact that Athenians demanded 
that the ephebes take an oath seems to suggest that the relation between 
officials and private citizens was different from that between the ruler and 
the ruled.  Rather, obedience to officials is a social norm, an ignorance of 
which could cause various disadvantages in social and political life.28 
                                                           
24 Demosthenes 47 provides a suggestive example of the difficulty with exaction of fines.  
The speaker, newly appointed trierarkhos, demands upon a certain Theophemos, who 
served as trierarkhos in the previous year, to return the equipment of the trireme, but in 
vain.  Again, the speaker, armed with the decree of the Council, goes to see Theophemos 
and makes the same demand.  A quarrel between them occurs and it develops into a 
fistfight (31-40).   
25 Berent (2004)138. 
26 RO 88, 11-14: ... καὶ εὐηκοήσω τῶν ἀεὶ κραινόντων ἐμφρόνως καὶ τῶν θεσμῶν τῶν 
ἰδρυμένων καὶ οὒς ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἰδρύσωνται ἐμφρόνως. 
27 Suppose, for instance, the relation between the teacher and his/her pupils at school.  It 
is based on power in the sense that the teacher can force his/her pupils to do their work 
and sometimes punish them.  But that does not mean that the former ‘rules’ the latter. 
28 Plato, Laws 647A in which two kinds of fear (φόβος), good and bad, are distinguished: 
one is to the enemies, which should be overcome; the other to bad reputation, which 
encourages people to do good.  See also 699C and Aristotle, Politics 1331a40-b1.  
Perikles in Thukydides 2.37.3, too, points out that Athenian obedience to their officials 
comes from fear (δεός).  cf. D.L. Cairns, Aidôs (Oxford, 1993) 359, n.47. 
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(3) Legitimacy of the Polis and Public Power 
     No monopoly of legitimate use of violence.  No apparatus of public 
coercive power.  Then, should we follow Berent who claims ‘force is never 
public and always private’?  In this point I think that Berent oversimplifies 
the situation and goes too far.   
     It is true that the recent experts of ancient Greek (more precisely 
Athenian) law have drawn our attention to that private enmity played a 
major role in the legal disputes, whether in private cases or public ones.  
Democratic Athens was the society where legal system was established.  
Even so, the Athenian lawcourt was an arena where private ‘feuding’ took 
place.29  Berent’s view seems to be supported by this academic trend.   
     But any execution must be done in the name of the polis.  It would 
suffice here to remind that when Euphiletos, the speaker of Lysias 1 and 
cuckolded husband, killed Eratosthenes the adulterer of his wife, he claims 
that he said ‘it is not I who am going to kill you, but the nomos of the polis, 
which you transgressed and had less respect for than your pleasure’.30  It is 
impossible to confirm that Euphiletos did say these words in the scene of 
killing Eratosthenes.  Yet it is still noteworthy that he (or Lysias) thought it 
necessary or effective to disguise himself as a public executioner at the 
court.31  
     Thus, we should assume that in the polis there is a public power or, at 
least, the concept of it.  Despite the absence of public coercive apparatus, 
how should it be possible?  I suppose that the issue of legitimacy is 
concerned here.   
     Modern state government, whether democratic or not, needs a 
legitimacy to rule its people and persuade them to be ruled.  Since the 
Middle Ages, legitimacy to rule has been one of the most important questions 
for rulers and scholars in Europe.  However, interestingly and curiously 
enough, as Berent, referring to Finley, points out, Greeks were not interested 
in by what ground a ruler or a regime or constitution was regarded as 
                                                           
29 e.g. Todd (1993); Hunter (1994); Cohen (1995).  But note a cautious comment by Allen 
in her (2000)21. 
30 Lysias 1.26: ἐγὼ δ᾽ εἶπον ὅτι "οὐκ ἐγώ σε ἀποκτενῶ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος, ὂν σὺ 
παραβαίων περὶ ἐλάττονος τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐποιήσω".  cf. Hansen (2002)22-26. 
31 Having said this, I think it wrong to interpret, as G. Herman does (CQ n.s. 43[1993]: 
406-419), these words as 'a sober desire to implement civic justice'. 
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legitimate to rule.  Berent wrongly views the Greek neglect of legitimacy in 
terms of the absence of public coercive apparatus (1996: 44-45).  Yet that 
there is no public coercive apparatus in the polis does not necessarily mean 
that there is not any legitimacy.  We should not forget that ‘they (i.e. 
Greeks) did not challenge the legitimacy of the city-state as the only possible 
political condition for the good life’.32   To put it another way, the polis itself 
represents legitimacy.   
     That the polis has legitimacy implies that any citizen, whether in office 
or not, by articulating the interest of the polis, can exercise a public power.  
Then, public power did not exist like a thing, nor was affixed to an apparatus 
or organisation.  Rather, citizens ‘construct’ it by performing as an agent of 
the polis.  This is what the institution-centred approach of both Hansen and 
Berent overlooks and fails to understand.  The absence of public coercive 
apparatus does not mean the absence of (the concept of) public power.  An 
official can exercise a coercive power, but it is not because he is an official.  
Unless he represents himself as an agent of public interest, he cannot 
exercise a coercive power.   
     Political activity in the polis is an attempt to construct this sort of 
public coercive power, and political struggle is the struggle over this power.  
But, what is the interest of the polis and what is not?  This is always 
arguable.  Here lies the reason for the vigorous and unstable character of 
the political life in the polis.  Vigorous, because citizens are encouraged to 
involve themselves in the political debate about what the interest of the polis 
is (in democracy in particular).  Unstable, because there is a large scope for 
manipulating the concept of public interest: any man who is judged to be 
against the public interest can be punished and, in an extreme case, put to 
death.  A political strife in the polis can turn into a violent conflict (stasis or 
civil war) and bring about a social and political disruption among the citizens. 
It is possible to see a cause of the unregulated character of the stasis in the 
ambiguous character of public power.33 
 
 
                                                           
32 Finley (1982)12. 
33 On the stasis, see, briefly, Cartledge (2000). 
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3. Conclusion 
     To conclude, I just repeat what I said above.  Through examination of 
the Berent-Hansen debate, I have tried to show: 1) the Greek polis did not 
monopolise the legitimate use of physical force; 2) officials were entitled to 
perform their duty, but the relations between officials and private citizens 
were not those between the ruler and the ruled; 3) public coercive power was 
constructed by each citizens performance as an agent of the interest of the 
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ML = R. Meiggs and D. Lewis (eds.), A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to 
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